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I. INTRODUCTION
Criminal procedure scholarship would not seem to qualify as a literary art
form, but in recent years it has generated a kind of literary genre: the
Reassessment of the Great Case, usually on some round-number anniversary.
Three of the most common subjects for this exercise have been Gideon v.
Wainwright,1 Mapp v. Ohio,2 and Miranda v. Arizona3, and for those we can

* Robert Weisberg, Edwin E. Huddleson, Jr. Professor of Law at Stanford; founder and Co-Faculty
Director of the Stanford Criminal Justice Center. It has always been an honor to be a guest at the McGeorge
Law School, where Professor Vitiello and his colleagues and students have always helped to enrich legal
scholarship.
1. 372 U.S. 335 (1983) (Sixth Amendment right of counsel in serious criminal cases). See, e.g.,
Symposium: The Gideon Effect: Rights, Justice, and Lawyers Fifty Years After Gideon v. Wainwright, 122
YALE L.J. 2106 (2013).
2. 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (exclusionary rule for Fourth Amendment violations applies to the states); see,
e.g., Symposium on The Fortieth Anniversary of Mapp v. Ohio, 52 WESTERN RES. L. REV. 371 (1997).
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identify some key elements of this literary genre. Most of the scholarship
favorably recalls these cases as announcing big broad declarations of the rights of
suspects or defendants4 and proceeds to a sober consideration of the current state
of those protections and often a distressed lament for how later Court decisions
have weakened them.5 The fourth case that has been subject to the anniversary
reassessment is Terry v. Ohio,6 and here, the genre takes a very different form.
Most obviously, in Terry the defendant lost. But also, as discussed below, in his
majority opinion Chief Justice Warren produced a somewhat tortured
compromise about how to balance police power against people’s privacy and
liberty, so that the theme of many Terry reassessments is not unfulfilled or
thwarted promise so much as tragic lament that we continue to suffer from its
defects. Indeed, for many, any appearance of elegant compromise in Terry is an
illusion masking Warren’s craven surrender to law enforcement.
But as a subject of reassessment Terry has still another distinction: Gideon,
Mapp, and Miranda are important for what they clearly, if controversially, did. In
none of the cases were the underlying facts terribly important,7 nor did the
language of the majority opinions contain problematic ambiguities.8 Not so for
Terry.
As a starting point, can we at least stipulate to Terry’s holding? In a
ridiculously simplified nutshell, Terry holds that if a police officer’s observations
of an individual induces in the officer’s experienced mind a reasonable suspicion

3. 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (suspects interrogated in custody must be warned of Fifth Amendment
rights). See e.g., Symposium, Miranda at 40, 10 CHAPMAN CHAP. L. REV. 531 (2007).
4. I am focusing here on academic scholarship, which in the American law schools academy tends to the
liberal side. While Gideon was not so controversial, obviously Mapp and Miranda were denounced and are still
criticized by entrenched law enforcement officials and tough-on-crime political voices, and Miranda has been
subject to a very vigorous line of empirical scholarship criticizing it for undermining law enforcement and
worsening crimecrim. E.g., Paul Cassell, Still Handcuffing the Cops? A Review of Fifty Years of Empirical
Evidence of Miranda’s Harmful Effects on Law Enforcement, 97 B.U. L. REV. 685 (2017).
5. For the relatively iconic Gideon the distress in the typical reassessment concerns the failure of our
overall system of justice to deliver on the case’s promises because of the lack of funding, see Mary Sue Backus
& Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases, a National Crisis, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1039
(2006). For the case’s incomplete coverage of misdemeanors, see Alexandra Natapoff, Gideon Skepticism, 70
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1049, 1070 (2013).
For Mapp, the typical reassessment criticizes or denounces the later limitations on the exclusionary rule, such as
through the good-faith exception, although Some commentators quite sympathetic to the overall Warren Court
revolution do argue that as practical matter the rule has been counter-productive. See Christopher Slobogin,
Why Liberals Should Chuck the Exclusionary Rule, 1999 ILL. L. REV. 363, 364–65 (1999). As for Miranda,
beyond the empirical critique noted above, commentators favorably disposed to the case criticize the Miranda
warning as an insufficient form of protection. E.g., Welsh S. White, Miranda’s Failure to Restrain Pernicious
Interrogation Practices, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1211 (2001).
6. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
7. The facts in Mapp are famously colorful, see Yale Kamisar, Mapp v. Ohio: The First Shot Fired in the
Warren Court’s Criminal Procedure “Revolution,” in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE STORIES 45, 47–48 (Carol Steiker
ed., 2006), but the point of the case was blunt: an illegal search that would have led to exclusion of evidence in
a federal case does so in a state case. The only key fact in Miranda is that the suspect was not given the
warning.
8. Of course Miranda created uncertainties about doctrinal issues the Court left open (e.g., what is
custody?; what is a true waiver?), see White, supra note 5, but the language of the holding itself is pretty
straightforward.
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that the person is engaging in or about to commit a crime, the officer may detain
the person for a brief period to investigate (and can then arrest the person if the
suspicion turns into probable cause). Then, if during this investigative stop the
officer has reason to think the person might pose physical harm, the officer can
“frisk”—i.e., do a “patdown” of the person’s outer clothing, and if the officer
infers a reasonable chance of a concealed weapon, the officer can then reach
farther in to retrieve it.9 These actions are indeed regulated by the Fourth
Amendment, but they do not require a warrant or probable cause, and if the Terry
rules are followed, the police of course can use any resulting evidence against the
person. And, the case held all this on the basis of a deceptively simple—and now
famous—set of facts. The very experienced Officer McFadden saw Terry and
two other men walking back and forth along some store fronts, suspected that a
robbery was afoot, confronted them, asked their names, got an unclear response,
frisked Terry for a weapon, and found a gun that then established probable cause
for arrest for illegal possession.10
But, on Terry anniversaries over the last half a century, the reassessors of
Terry still ponder the fine details and ambiguities of the facts of the case and the
vexing and often frustrating linguistic details of the way Warren renders them in
the opinion. Here are just a few examples. Warren retells McFadden’s narrative
of events in deceptive detail, ostensibly recreating McFadden’s visual
observations second by second and yet implicitly emphasizing the gaps in the
officer’s narrative. As a result, in academic recounting of Warren’s recounting of
McFadden’s recounting, debates continue about how many times Terry and his
accomplices walked back and forth; whether they might have been on the verge
of abandoning their plans; what type of store they were checking out; and what,
if anything, to make of McFadden’s statement that Terry “mumbled something”
to him.11 And, as a doctrinal matter, (as will be discussed more below), we still
debate at what point, in the Court’s view, McFadden crossed the Fourth
Amendment line and “seized” Terry, and, if the crossing occurred early in the
encounter, whether McFadden had any objectively suspicious facts or was just
relying on his intuition that “they didn’t look right to me at the time.”12
Notably, the factual and doctrinal uncertainties are reflected in some odd
tonalities in the opinion. At key points Warren sounds either ambivalent or
cynically sarcastic about his own holding, such as when he refers to “the power
of the police to ‘stop and frisk’—as it is sometimes euphemistically termed—
suspicious persons.” Was Warren writing in a tone of subtle nuance, or did he
(ironically) “mumble” evasively, in neurotic anxiety?
These odd details are markers of the vexing questions raised in many of the

9. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
10. Id. at 6, 7.
11. E.g., Lewis B. Katz, Terry v. Ohio At Thirty-Five: A Revisionist View, 74 MISS. L.J. 423, 434–35
(2004).
12. Terry, 392 U.S. at 5.

889

2020 / The Eternal Task of Understanding Terry v. Ohio
Terry reassessments. Did Terry save the populace from a potentially lawless
police practice by at least somewhat subjecting the stop-and-frisk tactic to the
Fourth Amendment? Or, did Terry start and signal the end of a robust application
of the warrant and probable cause requirement? But, more specifically, did Terry
grant the police the crucial power to stop/detain without ever pausing to define
the scope and basis of that power? Did Terry place any meaningful restrictions
on the power of the police to frisk when they legally do a stop?
These last two questions arise in part because of the oft-noted dissonance
between Warren’s opinion and the Harlan concurrence.13 Harlan either clarifies
or corrects Warren14 on the crucial point that the power to frisk does not even
arise until there is a legal stop.15 And, Harlan either clarifies or disagrees with
Warren on whether the power to frisk is ‘automatic” once there is a legal stop.16
While, as I will show below, various interpreters of Terry at various times since
1968 have purported to draw clear answers to these questions, dissatisfaction by
and disagreements among the “anniversary reassessors” and very recent legal
developments show that the answers are unsettled or in flux. In effect, the key
gaps in the Warren opinion, and the disjointed relationship between the Warren
and Harlan’s opinion, represent the “original sin” of Terry, a sin that has not yet
been redeemed.
In this Essay I have two goals. First, I will “reassess the reassessments,”
drawing on some of the most useful and representative anniversary commentaries
on Terry to give an updated sense of how Terry still haunts our criminal justice
system in light of the questions I have just elaborated.17 Second, I will synthesize
these continuing perplexities, reframing them into the key questions: What
exactly does reasonable “suspicion” mean? Does the evocative word “suspicion,”
suggest a perception of some kind of social malevolence, or is it an unnecessarily
evocative term meant to stand for a probability assessment—i.e., “reasonable
cause” as a subset of “probable cause?” If so, how do we now make that
probability assessment in light of changes in the laws of drugs and guns—the
subjects of most instances of “reasonable suspicion.” That is, how do we
reconcile the “procedural” law of stop and frisk with changes in substantive
criminal law? Then, just what is the operational meaning of the term “armed and
dangerous?” What does it mean to “investigate” upon a legitimate stop? And,
13. Id. at 31 (Harlan, J., concurring).
14. With deceptive politeness, Harlan says he is “constrained to fill in a few gaps” in the majority
opinion. Id.
15. Id. at 32.
16. Id. at 33.
17. Of course the scholarship on Terry and the issues emanating from it are voluminous beyond any
power to inventory, much less review. I am concentrating on the overall “reassessment” as distinct form of
scholarship. Also, I am looking at Terry issues almost wholly in terms of the visceral encounter of police officer
and individual. Thus, I am not addressing one of the key emanations from Terry, the extensions of its
“reasonableness” balancing into the great variety of “administrative searches or “special needs” contexts in
which the Court has relaxed the requirements of warrant and probable cause, e.g., Michigan Dept. of State
Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (drunk-driving roadblocks without individualized suspicion); New Jersey v.
T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (searches of public school students on mere reasonable suspicion).
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how do we tell a stop from an arrest at the moment of seizure or during the
various stages of a seizure?
II. EXEMPLARY ASSESSMENTS
A. The “Standard Model”
While there are a very many anniversary treatments of Terry, I will choose a
few telling ones that represent certain rough subcategories. One of the richest
commentaries is by Professor Lewis R. Katz, and while it is full of original
insights, it can also stand as what might call the standard model of the Terry
reassessment—and that means a fairly negative one. For Professor Katz, while
Terry gave the police a great crime-fighting tool, it “dismally failed” in its
balancing between law enforcement and privacy.18 First, Terry miserably failed
at one of the main jobs implicitly entailed by the certiorari grant—to define an
“investigatory stop.” The result, Processor Katz avers, was that later courts could
exploit this failure so as to render the Fourth Amendment irrelevant to most onthe-street police-citizen encounters. While, he notes, the Court recognized that it
was writing at a crossroads moment of both widespread public fear of crime and
heightened concerns about racist abuses by police, Terry left judges with a
paucity of doctrinal resources to alleviate these roiling social tensions.19
Professor Katz notes that Terry could at least have borrowed from Miranda in
one sense: It could have written some “prophylactic rules” that could have
guided both policed and judges and mitigated the risks of arbitrary and racist
police and judicial decisions.20 What might such rules have looked like?
Professor Katz does not say, but he does suggest that there might have been
administrable, if somewhat arbitrary, set of formulas that would have supplied at
least some leverage for constraint.
Professor Katz then turns to a very odd (and one might say) gratuitous
portion of the Terry opinion, Chief Justice Warren’s strange comments on the
exclusionary rule. Here, Warren admits that legitimating the stop-and frisk has
the effect of denying suspects like Terry the benefits of Mapp’s exclusionary
rule. But, he rationalizes this outcome by (perhaps disingenuously) lamenting
that the rule would do little good anyway to constrain abusive police stops. The
reason is that a great deal of the time, the police detain people to preemptively
thwart crime or to control the risk of social disorder without any expectation that
there will be an adjudication of a crime where suppression of evidence would
matter.21 For Professor Katz, in what proved to be his penultimate year in the
Court, and after more than a decade of pathbreaking constitutional expansion,
18.
19.
20.
21.

Katz, supra note 11, at 424.
Id.
Id. at 427.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 13.
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Warren was abdicating the leadership role the Court had taken on in Mapp and
Miranda. He was making an “amazing admission of powerlessness from a Court
that purported to care about the issue.”22 As Professor Katz acerbically put it,
“Thus, the Court elected not to marshal whatever was left of its moral strength to
demand that police obey the law while enforcing it.”23
And, Professor Katz then offers a very sharp insight into the illogic of the
opinion on this point. He observes that the Court’s remarks about the
exclusionary rule were based on the erroneous assumption that McFadden’s only
option was to seize the men. If, as Warren says, the rule is irrelevant in that a
great number of cases where the police do not foresee arrest or prosecution—that
is the officer’s goal is to prevent a crime by discouraging or dispersing the
suspects—McFadden could have scrutinized their behavior by continuing to
follow them. Thus, says Professor Katz, McFadden could have simply let the
men know without confronting them that he was a police officer.24 No robbery
would have been committed on that street at that time, and the suspected crime
would have been prevented in a far less invasive way.
Professor Katz concedes that such a suggestion might invite the criticism that
anything less than a seizure, a search, and ultimately an arrest would have left the
men armed and free to commit a robbery somewhere else later on.25 But,
Professor Katz notes, that criticism presumes something that the premise of the
stop, as approved by Warren cannot support: that McFadden had a very strong
basis for inferring they were about to commit a robbery, or indeed, at the time of
the stop they had guns. And, this argument by Professor Katz identifies another
conceptual problem in Terry. Could McFadden have, in effect, “investigated” the
men even without seizing them? Or, does “investigation” under Terry mean
doing something that requires a seizure? And if so, exactly what does postseizure “investigation” legally entail? As discussed later,26 questions remain
about how long police can protract a stop to perform a legitimate investigation,
but Professor Katz shows that the problem of defining “investigation” arises even
before the stop begins.
Ultimately, the heart of the “standard model” critique, as deftly wrought by
Professor Katz, is that Warren never really told us when the stop occurred or
acknowledged that the possibility that what might otherwise strike a person as an
innocuous request sounds very different when it comes from a police officer. If
Warren meant that no stop occurred before McFadden laid hands on Terry and
spun him around, then Professor Katz’s reaction is, “Only an ostrich could reach
that conclusion.”27 But, the consequence of that conclusion is that Warren never
has to decide what level of suspicion might permit an officer to do what
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
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McFadden clearly did earlier in the encounter, unless Warren meant that at that
point the men would have felt perfectly free to leave. So, writing decades after
Terry, Professor Katz observes,
if the Court truly could not tell precisely when the seizure took
place, that uncertainty demonstrates a complete lack of
understanding of the relationship on the street between police
and citizens, especially between police and black citizens. It is an
understanding that the present Court totally lacks, but we had
expected better of the Warren Court.28
In the end, Professor Katz concludes, “What the Court, in fact, did was uphold a
seizure on less than probable cause based on little more than race.”29
In further elaboration of the “standard model,” Professor Katz traces the
metastasis of Terry’s recklessly sloppy treatment of detentions into a variety of
worrisome stop contexts in such cases as United States v. Mendenhall,30 INS v.
Delgado,31 Florida v. Bostick,32 and United States v. Drayton.33 Finally,
Professor Katz adds a very poignant exception-that-proves-the rule memoir of
personal experience that illuminates the incredible assumptions the Court made
in rationalizing searches and seizure in these contexts.34
One more important feature of the “standard model” reassessment comes
from Professor David Harris.35 Canvassing post-Terry cases in the lower courts
on the specific issue of “particularized suspicion,” he finds something very
surprising: What he calls the Court’s “rhetoric” about particularized suspicion
has hardly changed since 1968, the lower courts having “gradually but
unmistakably eroded the force of these words.”36 Professor Harris laments that
courts, without saying so, have extracted from Terry virtually per se categories or
28. Id. at 442.
29. Id. at 451.
30. 446 U.S. 544, 545 (1980) (holding that an arguably coercive stop was a consensual encounter).
31. 466 U.S. 210 (1984) (during government sweep of factory for possible immigration violators, words
of “request” for identification do not amount to “demand” and thus no seizure occurred).
32. 501 U.S. 429, 430 (1991) (holding that police questioning of passengers sitting in Greyhound bus
during a brief scheduled stop does not necessarily amount to a seizure simply because person did not feel free to
leave out of fear of benign being stranded when bus imminently left).
33. 536 U.S. 194, 195 (2002) (similarly to Bostick, holding that situation of passenger confronted on bus
did not vitiate consent to search his bag).
34. In 1969 Professor Katz was already a law professor and a Naval reserve officer when, traveling on a
Greyhound bus, he was approached by a federal agent who demanded to see his identification and draft card,
presumably checking on possible draft evaders. Professor Katz refused to comply, leaving the agent angry but
helpless, but he knew then that most people so confronted would not have the legal knowledge and confidence
to stand by their rights. And he asks us to recognize that if we transpose his story to the modern cases of young
men of color on urban streets or on commercial buses, most individuals would feel compelled to acquiesce to
the police. Katz, supra note 11, at 484.
35. David A. Harris, Terry and the Fourth Amendment: Particularized Suspicion, Categorical
Judgments: Supreme Court Rhetoric Versus Lower Court Reality under Terry v. Ohio, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV.
975 (1998).
36. Id. at 976.
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contexts where facts that are perhaps at most indicia of suspicious behavior
become conclusive proof—e.g., being in a “high crime area” or exhibiting a
desire to avoid the police. Thus, while sometimes paying rhetorical fealty to the
idea that certain facts are just factors in an overall weighing of reasonable
suspicion, lower courts have slowly and steadily created categories of cases
which allow police to frisk after a stop, whatever the specific facts are.37 In
Professor Harris’s view, they have done this by making general declarations that
crimes that police may plausibly regard as dangerous and hence friskable people
whom they suspect of crimes that do not necessary involve weapons. Thus, under
these cases, a frisk is automatic upon any legitimate stop that falls into one of the
“always frisk” categories. In effect, the courts have treated the Harlan
concurrence as the operative law, even though, Professor Harris insists, Harlan
was disagreeing and not clarifying Warren on this point.38 For Professor Harris,
unless the Supreme Court corrects this problem, Terry will lose its legitimacy,
and become, in practical terms, a decision which legally permits a stop and a
frisk of almost anyone, for almost any reason.39
B. Counter-Standard Models
While the highly critical Katz and Harris reassessments surely represent the
majority tone of this art form of scholarship, there are reassessments that take a
positive position, although these counter-standard models are very heterogenous.
Perhaps the most striking is the refreshingly, if jarringly, provocative view of
Professor Akhil Amar.40 And, a distinctive feature of his reassessment is its
balance of fervent praise with Terry with harsh criticism. Professor Amar’s
strategy is to speak of the good Terry and the bad Terry.
Professor Amar’s good Terry is very good indeed. In his endorsement of the
Warren opinion, he says that by affirming the legality of seizures and searches
that lack warrant and probable cause, Terry affirmed what he (Professor Amar)
has long argued is the correct foundational view of the Fourth Amendment as
expressed in its very textual language. The only textually mandatory rule for
searches and seizures is that they be “reasonable.”41 The Framers phrased the
warrant and probable cause rules the way they did—warrants require probable
cause and particularity, but searches and seizures do not require warrants—
because, in the English regime we inherited, warrants were the problem, not the
solution. In a feint toward criticism, Professor Amar acknowledges that Chief
Justice Warren “must bear some of the blame for the current confusion”42
37.
38.
39.
40.
(1998).
41.
42.
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because the opinion does not make this magisterial principle clear enough. So
writing on the 30th anniversary, Professor Amar announces that the time has
come to eschew the confusing and contradictory language that Warren had taken
from earlier cases, and indeed he is reassured that some post-Terry cases clarify
what he believes Warren surely and laudably meant all along.43
There is a premise of the good Terry that leads us to understand Professor
Amar’s bad Terry. The good Terry takes a generously broad view of searches and
seizures so that the Fourth Amendment could apply to “myriad ways in which
government might intrude upon citizens’ persons, houses, papers, and effects.”44
The bad Terry that emerges is that as we parse the details of the case we come to
fear that the broad view was not broad enough. With the flexible standard of
reasonableness, the Court should have been able to intervene even earlier in the
encounter and not wait until what has become, in the Terry lore, the
controversially late-in-the-narrative location of the seizure. Professor Amar
laments, “Sustained and purposeful surveillance by the unaided eye, the bad
Terry implied, is not a Fourth Amendment ‘search’ and thus, apparently, need
not be reasonable.”45 So for Professor Amar the Fourth Amendment may have
applied even when McFadden first engaged in his arguably authoritarian initial
encounter with Terry. In effect, a hypothetical Justice Amar would have added
his own concurring opinion to Justice Harlan’s.
And, in a further twist, the flexibility of the pure reasonableness standard
permits Professor Amar to diversify (or hedge) his agreements or disagreements
with other perspectives. If law enforcement would resist early intervention of the
Fourth Amendment because it might set too demanding a standard for a
borderline-coercive encounter, then no problem: reasonableness allows us to
calibrate or adjust the height of that bar in proportion to the degree of coercion.46
And, Professor Amar has still more ways to adjust his distinctive reading of
the Fourth Amendment to address or accommodate disparate views. He is well
aware of the racially disparate effects of police discretion, and thus aware that his
praise of the good Terry will provoke criticism that he fails to acknowledge the
racial justice problem. But, he is confident, even Panglossianly so, that “the
spacious concept of reasonableness allows us to look race square in the eye,
constitutionally.”47 On the other hand, this “spacious concept” will also allow us
to sensibly and flexibly implement the presumption that the Bill of Rights is
designed to be counter-majoritarian by being “suitably responsive to popular
sentiment.”48 Finally, Professor Amar concedes that it might be an aspect of the
43. Id. at 1125 (citing Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (upholding saucepan
stops at police roadblock checkpoints as reasonable), and Veronia School District 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646
(1995) (upholding as reasonable random drug testing of high school athletes)).
44. Id. at 1098.
45. Id. at 1099.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 1098.
48. Id. at 1099.
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bad Terry that Warren seems tragically disconsolate that the exclusionary rule is
helpless in the face of common stop and frisk activity. But, to the rescue, the
good Terry would turn this into a positive by taking the opportunity of the stop
and frisk to remind us that, as Professor Amar has also long believed, the
exclusionary rule has no constitutional basis in the first place.49
Thus, the hypothetical Amar concurrence makes highly versatile use of the
Terry case to accomplish all the goals his theory of the Fourth Amendment seeks
to fulfill.
A different kind of counter-standard assessment comes from Professor
Stephen Saltzburg.50 The Amar assessment is theoretical, normative, even
aspirational, with side reassurances that it could be implemented pragmatically.
By contrast, Professor Saltzburg’s stays close to the pragmatic, confidently
asserting that the core Terry holding was a sound doctrinal way of balancing the
Fourth Amendment and public safety, while acknowledging that this proper
balance needed some post-Terry years to become clear, and recommending one
key refinement. Professor Saltzburg is confidently assertive at the start:
My thesis is rather simple and straightforward. It has four prongs.
First, Terry itself failed to provide a clear enough yard-stick for
law enforcement, and without further elaboration by the Supreme
Court, the doctrine might have become unworkable. Second,
subsequent Supreme Court elaborations on Terry have developed
a standard that is as clear as most Fourth Amendment standards
can be and that is adequate to distinguish permissible from
impermissible law enforcement confrontations with citizens, at
least as far as stops are concerned. In fact, the results reached
under Terry are practical, reasonable and defensible. They are
practically as perfect as we are likely to get. Third, the extension
of Terry to a number of different situations that are analogous to
stops has been, for the most part, logical and defensible. Fourth,
the aspect of Terry that is most problematic and that requires a
more subtle approach than the Court has offered thus far is “the
frisk.”51
Perhaps the key here is that as compared to Professor Amar’s virtually
celebratory explanation of the good Terry, Professor Saltzburg has very modest
expectations for the ability of the Fourth Amendment to do all it is being asked to
do in the highly fraught arena of police-citizen encounter. And, in his view, the
Court’s performance in doing so is, well, not great, but at least defensible.

49. Id. at 1119.
50. Stephen A. Saltzburg, Terry v. Ohio: A Practically Perfect Doctrine, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 911
(1998).
51. Id. at 911–12.
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Professor Saltzburg observes with some respect, but considerable concern,
that Warren limited his opinion to a deceptively narrow question, i.e., “[W]e have
no occasion to canvass in detail the constitutional limitations upon the scope of a
policeman’s power when he confronts a citizen without probable cause to arrest
him.”52 In initial harmony with the standard model critique he laments that
Warren’s opinion provides:
virtually no guidance to either the police or the public as to what
a police officer may do when confronting suspicious behavior.
Notwithstanding the fact that Terry is widely known today as a
reasonable suspicion case and as establishing a reasonable
suspicion standard, one can find nothing in Chief Justice
Warren’s opinion to support the claim that he thought that was
the standard the Court was adopting.53
Still Professor Saltzburg offers a more generous take on parts of the holding,
including the gaps and ambiguities, arguing that the Court was quite aware of and
sympathetic to the difficulties that law enforcement officers face when they are
called upon to make split-second decisions: “The Chief Justice understood that
Detective McFadden and others like him could not be present indefinitely in front
of a single store, if they were to do their jobs, and they must sometimes act when
criminal activity may be ‘afoot’ or lurking.”54
But, in any event, Professor Saltzburg goes on to cite a series of cases that, in
his view, cure any of Warren’s gaps or errors. Some of these are cases that many
critics of Terry lament or even denounce because, the argument goes, they prove
how dangerous Terry ultimately turned out to be. But, for Professor Saltzburg,
the opposite is true: For him, they clarify that the true heart of the Terry doctrine
is that a stop is to be based on “reasonable suspicion” that justifies an
“investigatory stop” and entails a frisk. Thus, he positively notes Adams v.
William,55 where the Court upheld reasonable suspicion based on an informant’s
tip and no direct police observation. Professor Saltzburg praises the Court’s
willingness to permit the officer to consider “the area in which the car was
located, the time of the morning, the absence of any legitimate explanation for
the car’s presence, and his familiarity with the tipster in deciding that he should
intervene and confront the suspect.”56 And, Professor Saltzburg admires the
Court for appreciating that “no police officer could be expected to approach a
suspect who is supposed to be armed and who may be involved with narcotics

52. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16. See Saltzburg, supra note 50, at 920.
53. Id. at 926. Professor Saltzburg suggests that this gap in Warren’s opinion reflected his effort to deal
with the different factual postures of the companion cases of Peters v. New York and Sibron v. New York, 392
U.S. 40 (1968).
54. Saltzburg, supra note 50, at 927.
55. 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
56. Saltzburg, supra note 50, at 944.
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without checking for weapons.”57 In doing so, avers Professor Saltzburg, the
Court confirmed that the Harlan concurrence’s “two-step” explanation of the
majority opinion in Terry has become the operative law.58
But Professor Saltzburg, one should note, does not praise Terry for
necessarily favoring police; he praises it for getting the balance just right. Thus
he approves of Almeida-Sanchez v. United States,59 where the Court held that
roving near-the-border searches without probable cause were impermissible but
where the Court took pains to refer to Terry and Adams in noting that the
Government had not even tried to justify the searches on reasonable suspicion
grounds. But, he also approves of United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,60 where the
Court justified stopping cars near the border without probable cause if the police
have Terry reasonable suspicion, but still put some teeth into that standard by
rejecting a stop based solely on the driver’s supposedly ‘Mexican” appearance.
Professor Saltzburg actually has a more mixed view of the application or
extension of Terry into new contexts. He applauds the extension to seizures of
property in such cases as United States v. VanLeeuwen,61 where, in his view, in
allowing a temporary seizure of mail reasonably suspected to be contraband the
Court solved a practical problem for the police parallel to the pedestrian street
stop in Terry.62 On the other hand, and somewhat cursorily, Professor Saltzburg
seems to disdain the application of Terry to some contexts usually placed under
the umbrella term of “special needs” or balancing cases. He approves of New
Jersey v. T.L.O.63 where the Court permitted searches without probable cause in
public high schools so long as they met a Terry-style criterion of reasonableness
in terms of a balance of the schools parens patriae duties and students’ privacy.64
By contrast, he disapproves of Griffin v. Wisconsin,65 where Justice Scalia
relieved the police of the probable cause requirement in the search of a
probationer. As Professor Saltzburg notes aprovingly, the Court found the search
sufficiently justified by the probation official’s direct experience with the
probationer, the need to protect confidential sources, and the assumption that the
probationer is in need of monitoring and rehabilitation because of his established
criminal proclivity. And, in particular he says that the confidential source
argument “sheds no light on whether a probable cause or reasonable suspicion
standard”—the heart of Terry to which Professor Saltzburg is so devoted. “The
rationale for a rule of necessity is not easily extended to justify rules of
convenience.”66 Thus, while Professor Saltzburg sees some value in this species
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
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of special context interest balancing, he would limit these extensions of Terry to
situations where there is some distinct need for quick action—in which case
Terry itself can apply.
Finally, Professor Saltzburg has one enduring objection to the Warren
opinion itself—although it still reflects his Terry loyalty because it involves the
Harlan concurrence. Warren, of course, seemed to apply the reasonable suspicion
standard with respect to the danger to the officer that justified a frisk. Harlan
believed that the right or power to the frisk should be “immediate and automatic”
if the stop is legitimate—at least if the suspicion is about a crime of violence.67
And, Professor Saltzburg regrets that later courts have not heeded Harlan’s
view.68 At the very least Professor Saltzburg wants to set a rule that gives a huge
benefit of the doubt to the officer:
Recognition of the automatic nature of the frisk is preferable
than [sic] pretending that it is reasonable to individualize
decisionmaking in these circumstances. When no officer can be
reasonably certain that a person is not dangerous, and the
circumstances—one on one contact, darkness, and the size of a
suspect, for example—indicate that danger might be present, an
officer should be able to make a frisk. An officer should not be
denied the right to self-protection simply because the conditions
surrounding the stop make it impossible to make a reasoned
determination about danger.69
But overall, Professor Saltzburg concludes, with perhaps just a touch of
rhetorical wryness, that
the Terry rule that I regard as practically perfect had clearly been
established in 1979. . . . If the Supreme Court pays more careful
attention to the arguments for permitting frisks or related selfprotective measures in future cases, the Terry rule will become
even more practically perfect than it presently is. The rule has
stood the test of time, but with a little refinement, it promises to
stand the test of the future.70
The most strikingly original of the reassessments comes from Professor
Susan Bandes.71 Her starting point is that Terry should be on her “hit list” of the
worst Supreme Court cases she can imagine—cases so awful that the historical
67. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 33 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring).
68. E.g., Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1979); Michigan v. Long, 63 U.S. 1032, 1049 (1983).
69. Saltzbrug, supra note 50, at 968, 970.
70. Id. at 951, 974.
71. Susan Bandes, Terry v. Ohio in Hindsight: The Perils of Predicting the Past, 16 CONST. COMMENT.
491 (1999).

899

2020 / The Eternal Task of Understanding Terry v. Ohio
counter-factual whereby they had never happened would carry clearly good
consequences.72 But, about Terry she is not so sure. Despite its possibly merited
place on the hit list, Terry has led Professor Bandes to conceive a new subgenre
of reassessment—where a bad case must be compared not to a better different
decision that could have been rendered on that occasion, but to the consequences
of there being no decision at all on that occasion. In a remarkable
interdisciplinary borrowing, she imagines how chaos theory might inform us in
this inquiry:
Chaos theory studies the behavior of dynamic systems, or
systems that are not in constant equilibrium. It posits that in such
systems, cause and effect are not linear or proportionate- instead,
seemingly minor causal agents may lead to disproportionately
major effects. The connection among forces in a system may
even appear random, though over time more complex and subtle
patterns may appear. But even these patterns will not be exactly
duplicative because each recurrence takes place in a different
environment. Moreover, individual systems do not exist in
isolation, but are themselves part of a complex environment that
is in a continual state of flux.73
So, what would have occurred if Terry had never been decided? Professor
Bandes notes that as Professor Wayne LaFave said at the time, the decision
“[left] room for later movement in almost any direction.”74 For her, the question
is especially difficult for an ambiguous case like Terry: Indeed, she finds the
question not just difficult, but likely incoherent. Terry asks the question at the
heart of criminal procedure: what is the proper balance between law enforcement
and citizens’ privacy and autonomy? And, Professor Bandes bluntly states,
“There can be no answer to this question that isn’t shaped by time, place, vantage
point, and a host of interactive, evolving societal forces.”75 Perhaps police would
have continued to stop and frisk suspects, mostly neighborhoods with poor
people of color, with no formal legal restraint. But what would have been the
secondary social and political effects? Would police departments respond by selfregulating in a manner somewhat parallel to Terry? Would local and state
governments have acted to fill the Supreme Court void? A few months after
Terry, Richard Nixon was elected in part because he exploited—and even
orchestrated—angry public reaction, sparked particularly by Miranda, to the
Warren Court’s perceived favoring of criminals over police.76 To ask how
72. Id. at 491.
73. Id. at 492.
74. Wayne R. LaFave, “Street Encounters” and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters, and Beyond, 67
MICH. L. REV. 40, 46 (1968).
75. Bandes, supra note 71, at 494.
76. Id. at 495–96.
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national politics would have changed without Terry one would have to know
what, if any, effect Terry had on the anti-Warren anger. Did it exacerbate it or
assuage it? Would the non-declaration of the Terry holding led to more sympathy
for or more fear of possible offenders? Would it have increased or decreased the
usefulness of crime as a topic for political demagoguery? These are questions
that call for highly sophisticated empirical political science and sociology—and
they may even be too difficult for the expert practitioners of those disciplines.
What about the courts themselves? Professor Bandes surmises that absent
Terry, lower courts, lacking guidance, would have continued generating
contradictory decisions that might have exacerbated uncertainty about all manner
of Fourth Amendment matters, including probable cause and consent.77
As for the Supreme Court itself, would it have gone on to more or less
expansive definitions of probable cause and consent? Would it have shifted to the
equal protection clause? As Professor Bandes nicely puts it, it is hard to say how
the Court would have deployed its “finite amount of capital.”78 As she
summarizes:
Was Terry wrongly decided? Yes. It didn’t achieve what it set
out to; it never faced the racial issues that have, if anything,
worsened; and it arguably placed its imprimatur on an abusive
set of practices. In the bargain it seriously damaged the structure
of Fourth Amendment law, allowing for an ad hoc, unprincipled
balancing whose costs go far beyond the excesses of stop and
frisk. Would we have been better off without it? That depends.79

III. THE CONTINUING PUZZLES OF TERRY
Drawing on the diverse and conflicted history of reassessments of Terry, I
now want to offer my own modest contribution to the art form—a kind of meta
reassessment in which I try to extrapolate the elements and implication of the
Terry legacy that make it such a haunting and troubled one for criminal justice.
In doing so, I will consider several cases which by virtue of being from lower
courts may soon disappear from scholarly attention, but which serve as
diagnostic markers of Terry questions witch most surely will not disappear.
A. Suspicion and Probability, Procedure and Substance
Rarely discussed in all the commentary on Terry is that Ohio generally
prohibited carrying of weapons, and this fact is important to the ambiguities of
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 497.
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the case.80 Granted that the case is rightly criticized for focusing on the frisk
rather than the stop, we know that reasonable suspicion, at least in retrospect, was
to be the standard for a stop. On the one hand, the very term “suspicion” in
Warren’s reference to hunches about Terry’s “suspicious appearance” suggests
that a general indication of malevolent intent might be the heart of the matter. On
the other hand, if we think of reasonable suspicion as a “lesser included” standard
under probable cause, then the suspicion must be of a crime and it is
probabilistic. Whatever the probability percentage is, it is obviously lower for a
stop than for an arrest. On the other hand, we now know from Terry that
reasonable suspicion may be with respect to a crime on the verge of occurring—
that it is “afoot”—so if we bring the “afoot” factor unto contact with the
probabilistic concept of reasonable suspicion, we might say that even while not
knowing which store they were aiming at, McFadden could make a certain
percentage probability assessment that some robbery would occur (or that
someone might have attempted or, to take things farther, might arguably be on
the verge of attempting a robbery). On the other hand, Warren’s statement of
facts can also be read as allowing McFadden to seize Terry on the probabilistic
assessment that he was carrying had already committed the crime of gun
possession. And, alas, it can also be read as essentially acknowledging that in the
streets of America, where police survey a terrain of human behavior giving off
murky signs of possible antisocial conduct, we must recognize the power of the
police to act on wizened intuition against possible “danger.”
This question whether we should view reasonable suspicion as a quantitate
subset of probable cause is important because over the decades the majority of
pedestrian stops under Terry have involved reasonable suspicion of crimes
involving drugs or guns, and perhaps most often the suspected is mere possession
thereof.81 Thus, if one side of the equation changes—that is the legality or
illegality of possession—then the Terry calculation might have to be altered—
and this is exactly what courts have only very recently begun to struggle with.
And as a premise for these questions, we must stipulate to the necessary
interaction of probable cause and reasonable suspicion. Some of the cases
discussed below are about probable cause, some about reasonable suspicion, and
some both. The point is that if reasonable suspicion is a step on a probability
continuum, the changes in substantive criminal law will apply to booth—but in
proportionate degrees.
B. The Problem of Marijuana
One obvious context for this issue is of course marijuana, because it has been

80. See the state court opinion in State v. Terry, 214 N.E.2d 114 (Oh. 1965).
81. For a through discussion of the commonest “reasonable suspicion” bases for stops, see generally
David Rudovsky & David A. Harris, Terry Stops-and-Frisks: The Troubling Use of Common Sense in a World
of Empirical Data, 79 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (2018).
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increasingly legalized in the states in recent years (put aside the fact that
marijuana possession remains a federal crime). How marijuana law reform
affects the Fourth Amendment depends on the nature of reform and the degree
and nature of “legalization.” Under particular new state laws, for example, is it
just use for medical purposes that is permitted? Is marijuana possession
decriminalized but still closely regulated? Is the legal immunity just for “personal
consumption” and in small amounts?
A major scholarly treatment of this question comes from Professor Alex
Kreit,82 but here I will just note some exemplary cases. Consider State v. Senna.83
Vermont law allows qualified registered patients to possess marijuana after going
through an administrative process. The court ruled that this law did not preclude
police from justifying probable cause of a crime solely on the basis of the smell
of marijuana. On the other hand, the court made clear that it had no immediate
occasion to consider whether Vermont’s recent decriminalization of small
amounts of recreational marijuana would call for a different oncome.84
But then consider the Massachusetts case of Commonwealth v. Cruz,85 where
the police stopped Cruz for a traffic violation and then ordered him out of the car
after detecting the odor of marijuana. The police ultimately found cocaine in the
car, but Cruz moved to suppress the cocaine because the discovery traced back to
the detection of marijuana. Cruz argued that because a recent state law
decriminalized possession of less than one ounce of marijuana in Massachusetts,
mere evidence or suspicion of marijuana did not give reasonable cause to believe
a crime had occurred. The court agreed. While in theory the police could have
been concerned with diving under the influence, in this case the officers did not
conduct any field sobriety tests to determine if the driver was presently under the
influence of marijuana. Because the state law, decriminalized possession of one
ounce or less of marijuana, the court inferred the voters’ intent to be that
possession of such amounts was to be solely a matter of civil regulation.86
Therefore, the odor of burnt marijuana “coupled with the driver’s statement that
he had been smoking earlier in the day” suggested that any marijuana that
remained would be less than one ounce.
Finally, the court found that although the state statute has no effect on the
crimes of possession with intent to distribute or operating while under the
influence of marijuana, “there was no probable cause to believe that any of those
offenses were being committed.”87 Without probable cause to believe that the
defendant or the driver was committing any criminal offense, the court
concluded, the police were not justified in ordering the defendant out of the car.
But the dissenting judge observed:
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Alex Kreit, Marijuana Legalization and Pretextual Stops, 50 U.C. DAVIS L.J. 741 (2016).
79 A.3d 45 (Vt. 2013).
Id. at 49–51.
945 N.E.2d 899 (Mass. 2013).
Id. at 905.
Id. at 904.
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Even though possession of a small amount of marijuana is now
no longer criminal, it may serve as the basis for a reasonable
suspicion that activities involving marijuana, that are indeed
criminal, are underway. The essence of reasonable suspicion is
that it justifies an inquiry that may result in establishing that no
offense has occurred, or that one may have occurred, but there is
insufficient evidence to proceed to probable cause. An inquiry
that does not produce evidence that supports going further does
not retroactively render unreasonable a suspicion that was
reasonable at the time.88
As Professor Kreit demonstrates, the degree to which courts have altered the
calculus of probable cause for arrest or reasonable suspicion for Terry stops
depends on the nature and degree of changes in particular state laws. The clearest
distinction is between laws that only “decriminalize” and those that more fully
“legalize.”89 Especially in that latter category, as he shows, the police will have
few opportunities to stop people on minor offenses and then leverage stops into
the possibility of finding true contraband or evidence of other crimes. So, cases
like Cruz will therefore affect the utility to the police of the important doctrine of
Whren v. United States,90 whereby so-called pretextual stops for minor offenses
based on objective evidence of minor offenses are permissible even if the true
intent of the police is to find evidence of something more serious for which they
lack sufficient cause. Whren, in effect, was built on Terry. It is what Terry in a
sense wrought, and we might ponder whether the effect on Terry of these
changes in substantive criminal law will cause Whren to lose its salience without
any need to overrule it.
C. The Problem of Guns
As compared the marijuana issue, supposedly safe assumptions about the
permissibility of a stop under Terry have been upended even more by the
application of the Fourth Amendment to gun possession, for at least two reasons:
First, the “legalization” or “decriminalization” of gun possession has taken on its
own constitutional force. Second, it is the gun which has exposed the continuing
fault line created by Warren’s clumsy meme of “armed and dangerous” and the
ambiguities it created in the relationship between danger and crime.
Does the Fourth Amendment apply differently depending on the severity of
gun regulation in a jurisdiction? Permits to carry concealed weapons are

88. Id. at 914–15.
89. Kreit, supra note 82, at 771.
90. 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996).
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notoriously hard to obtain in New York City,91 but so-called “shall issue”
jurisdictions are very generous with concealed handgun possession, using a
presumption of allowing concealed carry, subject to a few narrow exceptions.
(There can of course be parallel variations in regard to the legality of long guns
or open carry.) This issue taken on new salience since the Supreme Court’s
decisions in District of Columbia v. Heller92, finding a right to individual gun
ownership in the Second Amendment, and McDonald v. Chicago,93 applying that
right to the states. The scope of these cases and possible legality of some gun
control legislation are being worked out in many courts now,94 but only a few
courts have addressed this question of the relationship of the Fourth Amendment
and gun legislation.
One decision from the Illinois Court of Appeals, People v. Penister, is
usefully revealing.95The gist of the facts: Officer Whitlock and partner saw a car
run a red light and ordered a stop. After the driver, Rockett, did so, the officers
asked some questions and then asked Rockett and a passenger, Penister, to step
out of the car. Whitlock opened the glove compartment and found a handgun,
later the basis for a possession charge. In his suppression motion, Penister argued
that his possession of a gun did not give Whitlock reason to believe he had
committed any offense, because for all Whitlock knew, Penister might have had a
valid FOID [Firearms Owners’ Identification] card (although he did not have
one). The state argued Whitlock had probable cause to believe Penister was
“engaged in an activity that requires a license,” and that Whitlock was allowed to
wait until after the arrest to determine if the arrestee had the required license.96
The court vehemently disagreed, mockingly saying that by the state’s logic,
“any officer can wait outside any courtroom, arrest all persons who acted as
attorneys, and find out after the arrests whether the persons had the requisite
licenses to practice law” because unlicensed practice of law punishable as
contempt, or that if “any officer sees a person driving a car, the officer has
probable cause to arrest the driver, and the officer can find out later whether the
arrested person has a license to drive.”97 The heart of the problem was that the
police were acting on an “an outdated assumption” about the illegality of gun
possession. What should Whitlock have done? In the court’s view, once he
discovered the gun in the glove compartment, he should have tried to find out
whether either man had a permit, and only if there turned out to be no permit,
then arrest on probable cause. The court added that the short-cut taken by
91. See Rudovsky & Harris, supra note 81, at 535.
92. 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008).
93. 561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010).
94. New York State Rifle & Pistol Association Inc. v. City of New York, 140 S. Ct. 1525 (2020)
(holding that amendments to city’s handgun licensing scheme removing challenged prohibitions mooted
plaintiffs’ claims).
95. People v. Penister, No. 1-15-1552, 2018 WL 3005912 (Ill. App. Ct. June 14, 2018). The court
deemed the case “non precedential” and did not officially publish it.
96. Id. at 1–2.
97. Id. at 6.
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Whitlock here was an example of the kind of police action all too rife with the
potential for racial disparity.
Consider another very revealing case. In Ubiles v. United States,98 the
defendant attended the J’ouvert carnival, a festive and boisterous event, in the
U.S. Virgin Islands. An unidentified man approached officers to report there was
a young man in the crowd who had a gun in his possession; he described the
man’s clothing and appearance but did not explain how he knew that the man had
a gun, nor did he report anything unusual or suspicious about the man or his
behavior. Officers then approached Ubiles. They later conceded that Ubiles
exhibited no unusual or suspicious behavior when they approached him or when
one officer began talking to him, nor, on approach, could they tell whether Ubiles
was carrying any type of weapon. One officer nevertheless did a pat-down of
Ubiles and found a loaded gun that later proved to be unregistered.99
The District Court denied the suppression motion, saying rather
whimsically:
It’s the night of—I think I can take judicial notice of—can be
some heavy drinking. People are tired. So the kind of
information that was given by the older gentleman . . . that he
had just—pointing out the gentleman, describing the clothes that
the defendant was wearing, had a gun, was enough reasonable
suspicion for the law enforcement officers. . . to go over and
question him in an investigative style. Prudent thing to do.100
The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the officers had no reason to
believe that “a mere allegation that a suspect possesses a firearm, as dangerous as
firearms may be, justify an officer in stopping a suspect absent the reasonable
suspicion required by Terry.”101 Moreover, it noted, there was no general law
forbidding possession in public, and while there are ways to possess a gun
illegally in the Territory—such as by possessing an unlicensed gun or one with
an altered serial number—the government did not offer any even rough statistical
or probabilistic evidence about the frequency with which these gun illegalities
happen. Thus, deploying the same proves-too-much rhetorical ploy as in
Penister, the court averred:
This situation is no different than if Lockhart had told the
officers that Ubiles possessed a wallet, a perfectly legal act in the
Virgin Islands, and the authorities had stopped him for this
reason. Though a search of that wallet may have revealed

98. 224 F.3d 213 (3d. Cir. 2000).
99. Id. at 214–15.
100. Id. at 215–16.
101. Id. at 218.
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counterfeit bills— -the officers would have had no justification
to stop Ubiles based merely on information that he possessed a
wallet, and the seized bills would have to be suppressed.102
Thus, if a New York City police officer has probable cause that a person is
carrying a concealed weapon, the officer logically has very strong probable cause
of a crime to justify a full search or an arrest, but the opposite may be true in a
shall-issue place.
D. “Armed and Dangerous”
The gun issue brings us even deeper into the lingering uncertainties about
Terry. Recall that in Terry the Court said the police might legitimately suspect
that a person is “armed and dangerous,” raising the question whether that element
is itself an alternate basis for a stop. Can police officers infer that someone they
believe is armed is ipso facto dangerous enough to be stopped on that ground
alone? To push things farther, what if the basis for the stop itself has nothing to
do with guns—i.e., a traffic violation or a reasonable suspicion that a person on
foot has just committed a theft—and the police infer the person is carrying a
weapon. Does that inference justify a very forceful method of stopping the
person?103
Here is a recent case that raises that issue. United States v. Leo104 occurred in
Wisconsin, which generally permits people who are 21 or older and not felons to
obtain a concealed-carry license. The police relied on a tip about a possible
burglary; the tip was made in good faith but later proved inaccurate. They seized
Leo and his companion, Aranda, and because the tipster said Leo may have had a
gun in his backpack—and because he was spotted near a preschool—they
proceeded to pin him down and empty his backpack, never asking him any
questions. Leo turned out to be a felon, and so he was prosecuted for the gun.105
The government maintained that the search of the backpack was lawful
because the officers had “reasonable suspicion” that justified stopping Leo and
searching his backpack. The officer insisted, however, that the two suspects were
not under arrest when Leo was pinned and Aranda handcuffed.106 Rather, one of
the officers explained, he took these actions for safety reasons because, in his
opinion, potential burglars and armed suspects always present “a possibility of
violent action,” and unholstered guns also present a danger of accidental
discharge—especially near a preschool. Another officer testified that he detained
and handcuffed Leo to stop him “from reaching or grabbing the firearm.”
102. Id.
103. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 (1977) (holding that aggressive measures like
ordering a stopped driver out of the car are legal if they serve officer safety).
104. 792 F.3d 742 (7th Cir. 2015).
105. Id. at 744–45.
106. Id. at 745.
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The government conceded that the officers lacked probable cause to arrest
the men and thus could not search the backpack incident to arrest. And at the
time of the search, the officers knew neither Leo’s age nor criminal history, nor
did they inquire whether he had a license to carry a concealed firearm. But, the
district judge ruled that the search had been authorized as part of an investigatory
detention under Terry, and, despite the restraints on the men, they still posed a
danger, for the somewhat illogical reason that they were not under arrest.
Apparently, in the trial judge’s view, it was precisely because Leo had not yet
been arrested that he might still regain control of the backpack.107
The appellate court reversed, holding that at most the police had the power to
frisk—but not to open—the backpack.108 It distinguished Michigan v. Long,109 a
car stop case where the Court found that the driver had a lesser expectation of
privacy, and where the roadside encounter was more “fraught with danger,”
So let us consider yet another recent case, United States v. Robinson, one that
probes farther into the so-called “armed and dangerous concept.110 The events
happened in West Virginia, where, again, adults who are not felons can very
easily get a firearm permit.111 An unidentified man called the police to say that he
had just “witnessed a black male in a bluish greenish Toyota Camry load a
firearm [and] conceal it in his pocket” while in the parking lot of a 7-Eleven, and
that the Camry was being driven by a white woman and had “just left” the
parking lot. The 7-Eleven was in an area with the highest crime rate in the city,
especially for visible drug transactions. Indeed, when any local officer heard that
a report from that location, “your radar goes up a notch.”112 The officers tailed
the car, noticed that the two occupants were not wearing seatbelts, and made the
stop. One officer asked the driver for her papers and asked the passenger to exit
the car. Both complied, and an officer asked the passenger, Robinson, if he had
any weapons on him. The officer later testified that instead of responding
verbally, Robinson “gave [him] a weird look” or, more specifically, an “‘oh,
crap’ look[].” The officer then frisked Robinson and recovered a gun, and
Robinson was prosecuted for felon-in-possession.113
Robinson moved to suppress the evidence recovered as a result of the frisk.
He argued the police had no articulable facts demonstrating that he was
dangerous because, as far as the officers knew, he might have had a legal permit
to carry a concealed firearm. Robinson thus contended that the information that
police received from the tip described seemingly innocent conduct and that his
conduct at the time of the traffic stop also provided no basis for officers to
107. Id. at 746–47.
108. Id. at 749–51.
109. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). In Long, the Court allowed a search of the passenger comportment of a car
upon a stop for mere reasonable suspicion—i.e., a search not justified as a search incident to arrest. In effect, it
allowed that intrusion into the car to serve as a form of “frisk”.
110. 846 F.3d 694 (4th Cir. 2017).
111. Id. at 698.
112. Id. at 696.
113. Id. at 697.
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believe he was dangerous. In his view, as understood by the court, “Under the
logic of the district court, in any state where carrying a firearm is a perfectly legal
activity, every citizen could be dangerous, and subject to a Terry frisk and pat
down.”114
So, Robinson had no need to contest the district court’s conclusion that the
police had reasonable suspicion to believe that he was armed. Rather, he argued
that while the officers may well have had good reason to suspect that he was
carrying a loaded concealed firearm, they lacked objective facts indicating that he
was also dangerous so as to justify a frisk for weapons, since, as he read Terry,
an officer must reasonably suspect that the person being frisked is both armed
and dangerous. Moreover, he argued, his behavior during the stop did not create
suspicion—”he was compliant, cooperative, [and] not displaying signs of
nervousness.”115
But, the court rejected Robinson’s claim and held that the “armed and
dangerous” criterion for a Terry frisk was meant to unite the two terms, i.e., to be
armed is to be dangerous. In the court’s view, Robinson confused the standard
for making stops—which requires a reasonable suspicion that a crime or other
infraction has been or is being committed—with the standard for conducting a
frisk—which requires both a lawful investigatory stop and a reasonable suspicion
that the person stopped is armed and dangerous. Thus, the court concluded,
traffic stops of persons who are armed, whether legally or illegally, pose a great
safety risk to police officers.116
A concurring opinion at first seems to stake out a very different position,
acknowledging Robinson’s predicate point that the power to frisk does not derive
automatically from the power to stop.117 The concurring judge notes the view of
other Circuits that the unitary interpretation “would allow law enforcement
officers to frisk a wide swath of lawfully stopped individuals engaging in
harmless activity. Indeed, by definition, an individual is armed” if he is
“[e]quipped with a weapon. Armed, Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009).” The
concurring judge goes on to elaborate the arguably absurd consequences of the
unitary interpretation.118 Nevertheless, this gap between the majority and
concurrence turned out to be splitting hairs once the concurrence made clear that,
in its view, “armed” and “dangerous” are in theory separate but in fact usually
united because the suspected weapon is a gun.119 So the concurrence concluded
that while “treating individuals armed with firearms—lawfully or unlawfully—as
categorically dangerous places special burdens on such individuals . . ., we
recognize one such burden: individuals who carry firearms elect to subject
themselves to being frisked when lawfully stopped by law enforcement
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id. at 696.
Id. at 698.
Id. at 701–02.
Id. at 703 (Wynn, J., concurring).
Id.
Id. at 705.
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officers.120
The vigorous dissent in this case is perhaps the most telling opinion of all in
this recent suite of decisions. The gist of the dissent is that while guns are
inherently dangerous, when a state legislature has decided that civilians can be
trusted to be safe in carrying firearms on foot and in cars, the police should not
be able to contravene that trust by inferring danger from the fact or suspicion of
gun possession.121 Thus, the police could not reasonably point to danger where,
as here (at least as the dissent reads the facts),122 none of the conduct reported in
the anonymous tip was illegal—nor was it even unusual or “out of place” where
it occurred.123
There are several ironies here. The political irony—but not a selfcontradiction—is that a judge clearly inclined to the liberal side on Fourth
Amendment issues finds it useful to proclaim Second Amendment principles.
Indeed, the dissent stresses that without more “suspicious” facts, the police were
simply seizing Robinson because he was exercising a constitutional right.124
Another irony has to do with the officers’ citation of a “high-crime area.” The
dissent flips this point with the deceivingly obvious—and tragically plausible—
sociological observation that the high crime area is often exactly where would
find a high proportion of poor people of color.125
The dissent then homes in on consequences of the court’s view:
An armed citizen in an open-carry jurisdiction necessarily poses a
“danger” to the police that justifies a protective frisk if and only if
he appears to have committed some offense, however trivial—like
the seatbelt violation here—leading to a valid stop. If, on the other
hand, the police in this case had initiated a consensual encounter
with Robinson in the 7-Eleven parking lot, then the gun Robinson
was suspected of carrying would not have been grounds for a
frisk, as the government conceded at oral argument. Likewise,
had Robinson exited the car in which he was a passenger before
the police could conduct their pretextual traffic stop, then again he
would no longer be “dangerous” for purposes of allowing a Terry
frisk, notwithstanding the concealed gun in his pocket.. . . [I]t is
hard to see why an officer’s right to protect him or herself would
be made to turn on whether a dangerous person carrying a gun has
remembered to fasten his seatbelt.126

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
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Thus, one of the fault lines exposed by the dissent is that by the weird logic
of treating stops for traffic offenses as Terry stops, the criterion of “suspicion” of
“crime afoot” can be satisfied by a trivial traffic offense—or even a pedestrian’s
jaywalking offense—where the statistical likelihood or plausible expectation of
probable cause for an ultimate arrest might be nil. And, yes, the dissenting judge
bumps against the Whren principle. But, the judge not only acknowledges this;
she notes the perverse honesty of the officer in this case. He acknowledged that
he looked for and took advantage of a trivial traffic offense in order to follow up
on a very questionable anonymous tip that someone in the car was armed and
dangerous.127 The judge’s very point is that this case demonstrates the brutality of
Whren.
E. What Is an Investigation? What Is an Arrest?
1. A Question of Duration and Purpose
Now let us return to the Leo case above to see an important further problem.
One of the government’s arguments there was that the police officers acted on
legitimate safety concerns because they “did not have authority to detain Leo
indefinitely” and thus he might “be released in the parking lot of the preschool
with a weapon in his backpack.” Leo had no problem agreeing that the officers
could not hold him indefinitely on mere reasonable suspicion, and he leveraged
this point in his favor. He argued that if the officers could not elevate their
reasonable suspicion into probable cause during the investigatory stop, “the
Fourth Amendment demands that he was free to leave and to take his belongings
with him.”128
The court strongly endorsed Leo’s position, stating that a Terry stop cannot
continue indefinitely. A stop that is too prolonged becomes “a de facto arrest that
must be based on probable cause.” As the court put it, there are three possible
outcomes to a Terry stop: (1) the police can gather enough information to
augment reasonable suspicion to probable cause; (2) their suspicions may
become dispelled, and the suspect is released; or, (3) the suspicions of the police
are not dispelled, yet the officers have not developed probable cause and so must
release the suspect because the length of the stop is about to become
unreasonable.129
Here the police admitted they did not establish probable cause at the time of
the search of the backpack; they could plausibly argue that their suspicions had
not been dispelled; but they misconstrued Terry by reasoning that in that
dilemma they could hold Leo longer. To the court, “But this step, no matter how
convenient for the police, is not one that is authorized by Terry or any other
127. Id. at 709.
128. United States v. Leo, 792 F.3d 742, 751–52 (7th Cir. 2015).
129. Id. at 751.
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precedent” (emphasis in original).130 And, perhaps most tellingly, the court points
out that if the officers were concerned about the safety of the preschool’s
occupants, “nothing prevented them from following Leo into the building after
the investigatory stop to keep an eye on him in case he attempted any
wrongdoing.”131 Clearly, that action would not have extended the seizure.
So, the Leo case focuses our attention on a major fault line in post-Terry
jurisprudence. If the legal measurement for duration of a stop derives from the
“investigative” rationale that supposedly justifies Terry seizures in the first place,
the Court has not been helpful in telling us just what “investigation” means.
“Investigation” obviously has some common-sense and intuitive connotations,
but they are not very helpful in developing an administrable legal definition. We
could rest with the idea that if there is reasonable suspicion, the police can detain
for as long as is reasonably necessary to investigate and leave it at that. As I will
conclude below, the Court so far has probably has left it at that. But cases like
Leo suggest we need more.
For example, the Court could define investigation in more detail, although
Warren’s admonition in Terry about the wide variety of police-citizen encounters
makes that task seem daunting. Or, the Court might say that even very long
detentions are legal so long as whatever means the police are using to investigate
do not themselves require probable cause (i.e., a true search rather than a frisk).
Or, the Court could just say there is a specified (estimated?) time limit on a
detention regardless of the means of investigation. And, whichever approach the
Court takes, there is the follow-up question of what happens when the detention
goes on too long. Must a court then suppress whatever evidence comes from an
investigative step that occurs after the expiration moment, even if that step would
otherwise not require any reasonable or probable cause?
It turns out recently the Court actually has given us some help on these
issues. But, to see how requires a bit of a detour to—pun acknowledged—cars.

2. The Car Analogy and Investigation
Most of what the Court has said about the length of detention comes from the
somewhat distinct area of car stops. The closest thing we get to a constitutional
time measurement happens with an auto stop case, United States v. Sharpe,132
and we get a ruling that 20 minutes is not too long. But, Sharpe was not a typical
car stop case—that is, one for a traffic offense. Sharpe was about a drug
intervention that happened to involve vehicles, and the officer who protracted the
challenged detention of the vehicle did so to coordinate operations with another
130. Id. at 751–52 (The court noted that this legally baseless argument was also disingenuous, because
the search was a last-ditch attempt to find evidence of a crime before the clock ran out on the detention. This
was because the officer searched the backpack immediately, without even asking Leo to identify himself).
131. Id.
132. 470 U.S. 675 (1985).
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officer who needed some time to get there to participate in the investigation.
About 20 minutes after the initial stop, the police had probable cause to arrest,133
and the Court said that was legal because the circumstances excused the delay.
But, in the usual case of a stop for a traffic offense, it is way beyond the
expectation of the officer that she will arrest the driver. Yes, some traffic
offenses are deemed “arrestable” by statute and some not.134 But, even if a traffic
offense is theoretically arrestable, the police officer normally anticipates doing
just a few ministerial things during the stop—examine license, registration, and
insurance and perhaps ask the driver a few questions—and then write up a ticket.
Yes, she may also take the “plain sense” opportunity to notice whether there is
contraband immediately visible in the car or whether the driver exhibits signs of
being drunk (in which case the officer might then perform a field sobriety test).
But, most often, no such probable cause emerges, and the driver just drives off.
The courts call these typical auto stops “detentions” because they usually do
not lead to arrests. For this reason, in theory, the stop can be based on mere
reasonable suspicion of a traffic offense, but that sounds odd because, say, with
observed speeding or stop-sign running, why should the officer worry about
“reasonable suspicion” when she surely has probable cause—indeed virtual
certainty of the traffic offense? Perhaps the legal system has come to call these
detentions because the administrative tasks the officer must perform serve as a
useful proxy for our general notion of an “investigation”—and because these
tasks just happen to take about the same time as the Sharpe standard.
As for the auto detentions that do become arrests because probable cause of
drug possession or DUI gets established, we get some insights from two
important recent cases involving the odd confluence of dog sniffs and vehicle
stops. Because of the dog sniffs, first note the background decision of United
States v. Place,135 holding that in most circumstances the use of a police dog to
sniff out possible contraband in a private container does not invade any
expectation of privacy and so is not a Fourth Amendment event at all. Then, with
Place as a predicate, we have Illinois v. Caballes,136 where the Court held that
during the normal “investigatory” duration of a stop for a typical traffic offense,
the use of a police dog to sniff for contraband is of no constitutional moment
whatsoever because, thanks to Place, it does not add to the otherwise lawful
detention any intervention subject to the Fourth Amendment. But in Rodriguez v.
United States,137 police conducted the dog inquiry after the ministerial actions for
the traffic offense were done. So, the Court suppressed the evidence from the
133. Id. at 677–79.
134. Compare Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001) (police can carry out all incidents of an
arrest for a minor offense if it is “arrestable” under state law), with Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 171 (2008)
(Fourth Amendment allows search incident to arrest if police have probable cause to believe the person has
committed an act classified as a crime under state law even if state law does not authorize use of the arrest
power for that offense).
135. 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983).
136. 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005).
137. 575 U.S. 348, 356 (2015).
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sniff because the sniff had resulted from an illegal detention—i.e., a seizure no
longer needed to investigate the original “suspicion’ of the traffic offense, nor by
any independent reasonable suspicion of a drug crime.
But, in Caballes and Rodriguez, the Court’s job was made easier here
because the bureaucratic protocol of doing the paperwork supplied the functional
parameters of the detention. And, as noted, that paperwork just happens to take
about the same time as, or perhaps just slightly longer than, the detention in
Sharpe. So Caballes and Rodriguez leave unclear how we determine the
legitimate length of a stop in other contexts. Maybe, the answer should be about a
half hour under any circumstances. But, would the outcome in Sharpe have
changed if, because of some logistical problems, it took the second officer 90
minutes to get to the scene? Or, what if in a street stop of someone suspected of,
say, a robbery, the police need to hold the suspect for 90 minutes while they wait
for the victim to get to the scene to identify the suspect? Is the general
proposition that a detention can be as long as it can reasonably take to conduct
the specific form of investigation required by a specific crime or situation? If so,
the logical extension is United States v. Montoya-de Hernandez,138 involving the
detention of person suspected of drug smuggling. There, investigation was
simply waiting out the time of the bodily function needed to pass a swallowed
drug balloon—in that case, 16 hours. Maybe Montoya-de Hernandez can be
cabined as an international brooder case. But, far more mundane cases—like
Leo—remind us that the mystery of “investigation” has contributed to Terry’s
troubling legacy.
There is another way of reading Terry that might obviate these questions.
Professor Saltzburg has described one function of a detention as “freezing the
scene” until the police confirm or disconfirm the suspicious inference139 But,
there are surely cases where freezing the scene may be a kind of fake
investigation whereby the detention serves solely to thwart potential criminal
activity or scare off “suspicious” looking people. Perhaps, this is a laudable goal,
but it is not one associated with the principles of the Fourth Amendment. At most
it is a goal reluctantly acknowledged but not really embraced by Warren in Terry.
This is the context in which the police may have neither expected nor desired to
seize evidence, and so we recur to the tragic conclusion in Terry that that
exclusionary rule is useless.
Finally, what is the legal significance of a finding that a detention went on
too long? Rodriguez gives us one answer. But, a simple and more general answer
is that the seizure has become an arrest, and then, as noted, a court might reject
an un-Mirandized confession or a search-incident-to arrest. But, if so, perhaps we
all should have been addressing this question from the opposite direction.
Perhaps, we should work on defining an arrest. Alas, that question turns out to
remain surprisingly unresolved to this day.
138. 473 U.S. 531, 544 (1985).
139. Saltzburg, supra note 50, at 952.
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3. So, What Is an Arrest?
In 2003 Professor Thomas Clancy wrote an important article140 decrying a
remarkable confusion in American law: We do not know exactly what an arrest
is. Yes, we know someone has been arrested if she is hauled off to the station
house to be booked. We can also safely say a person has been arrested if the
police say to her, “You are under arrest.” But, the vagaries of police-citizen
encounters are such that that there are endless factual variations of seizures where
the Fourth Amendment does and should identify an arrest—not just a detention—
but where those two no-brainer factors are not present. These are cases in which
we must make the determination of arrest early on without benefit of later facts.
If the police are at the borderline between a Terry stop and an arrest, we have to
know whether the latter has happened to answer any of three legal questions:
First, must there be Miranda wanting before questioning, because we have
“custody” (which has come to mean the same thing as an arrest)? Second, can we
have a search beyond a frisk—the search incident to arrest. Third, do we need
probable cause?
And, here is the problem Terry has left us. Had there been no such thing as
Fourth Amendment regulation of that in-between species of a seizure called a
stop, perhaps the Supreme Court would have given us a better definition of
arrest. With the great variety of seizures now called stops under Terry, many
lying along a subtle continuum of interventions into personal autonomy, we are
often in a gray area where we just do not know for sure whether the incidents and
requirements of arrest obtain. From the vantage of either the suspect or the
officer or both, we face difficult questions: Do we just know that the detention
has become an arrest because the time for investigation has expired? Too often
we hear a definition of an arrest along the lines of “if a reasonable person would
not feel free to leave,” but such verbiage is useless because it really defines a
seizure and so does not tell us whether the seizure is a detention or an arrest.
Yes, the Supreme Court could offer help, but so far it has been feckless, as is
evident in its most recent approach to the question. In J.D.B. v. North
Carolina,141 a youth was summoned to an administrator’s office in his school to
be questioned about a crime. He was not given the Miranda warnings before the
questioning that led to inculpatory statements, but the state argued that he was
not in custody, i.e., had not been arrested, so no warning was needed.142 The
decision in the case is annoyingly oblique. It is not about the particular
vulnerabilities of a youth to questioning or whether a higher standard should
apply to youth in determining a waiver of Fifth Amendment rights, or whether a
quasi-Miranda warning rule should apply for youth who are seized but not in
custody. Instead the Court punts to the lower courts the question of whether the
140. Thomas K. Clancy, What Constitutes an Arrest within the Meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 48
VILL. L. REV. 129 (2003).
141. 564 U.S. 261, 265–66 (2011).
142. Id. See Berkemer v. McCcarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984).
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defendant was indeed in custody, all the decision accomplished was to add that
his youth should be one of several relevant factors in that determination.
What were those factors? We are told that in general they are such things as
the language or tone used by the police in addressing the suspect; the physical
surroundings or location of the questioning; the duration of the interview; the
extent to which the defendant is confronted with evidence of guilt; and, whether
the officers brandished weapons or touched the suspect.143
One might find this enumeration a description of types of facts that might be
noteworthy under a very general standard. But, one might prefer that for a
question of this import there be a nice bright rule. Better still, one might wish that
the Court had realized that some items on this list so overlap with many types of
facts that are consistent with a mere stop that they only confound all these Terry
questions. In the end, the decision rule comes close to tautology.
IV. CONCLUSION
In his brilliant review of the ways arrest has been defined, Processor Clancy
recounts every definition derived from the common law, state statutes, and state
constitutions, along with the vague adumbrations of the issue from the Supreme
Court. With a keen critical eye he knocks most of them down as obsolete,
anachronistic, tautological, vague, or unadministrable.144 But, at the very end, he
settles on one as at least a sensible or logical default—an arrest “is any seizure
exceeding the permissible bounds of a stop.”145 If that definition seems to depend
on a clear definition of these permissible bounds, it may seem doctrinally naïve.
But Professor Clancy is not naïve. He is wise, because he knows that because of
the vexing legacy that Terry has left us, it may be the best we can do.

143. J.D.B., 564 U.S. at 286.
144. See generally Clancy, supra note 143, at 129.
145. Id. at 193.
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